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IN THE SUPREME, COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EDITH RAGGENBUCK, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.EMIL SUHRMANN, djbja SUHRMANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT
COMPANY, and ALBERT NOORDA
and SAM L. GUSS, djbja JORDAN
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COMpANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8753

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the
record. The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in the trial court.)
STATEMEN'l, OF CASE
In the Pre-trial Order the trial court, among other
things, made the fol1owing order:

[, ~

"It is hereby ordered that all cases filed
against these defendants and each of them pertaining to damages for trichinosis claimed to be
contracted from eating mettwurst will be consolidated for trial as to liability, and those not
so consolidated will be dismissed."
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c

The defendants in the eleven cases here involved
petitioned this Court for an urder permitting an Intermediate Appeal from the above quoted order The petition was granted and we are now in the Supreme Court
on the question of whether the trial court had authority
to make this order and whether it abused its discretion.
While it should be of no importance, the defendants
have given a biased picture of the case. From the testimony it will .appear that the Valley Sausage Company
and the Jordan Meat & Livestock Company are uperated
by the same individuals. The Jordan ~I eat & Livestock
Company purchases all meats used in the joint operation
and "sells" to Valley Sausage Comp.any the meat products necessary to make sausage. The Valley Sausage
Company then "sells" the sausage to Jordan Meat &
Livestock Company, which company then distributes to
the retail customers. It is the contention of pl.aintiffs that
the smoking of the mettwurst in the Suhrmann oven was
part and parcel of the business being conducted by the
Valley Sausage and Jurdan 1\Ieat & Livestock Company.
As a matter of fact, the testimony will disclose that a
considerable .amount of this mettwurst was returned by
Suhrmann to Jordan Meat & Livestock Company which
in turn sold this mettwurst to retail outlets.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAL ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY ONLY IS NOT ERRONEOUS, IS NOT
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3
CONTRAEY TO LAW, AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE
·CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
POINT II.
THE I--RE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY
IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 'THE DEFENDANTS, AND
WOULD NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE
DEFENDANTS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING SAID ORDER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAL ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY ONLY IS NOT ERRONEOUS, IS NOT
CONTRARY TO LAW, AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE
·CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

The defendants contend they have been deprived of
a jury trial ~y this urder. The order merely consolidated
the cases for trial on the question of liability. After the
liability of the defendants has been established by a jury
then there will be a trial of the damage issues before
other juries. When the damage portion of the cases are
tried the cases will be grouped so there will be a number
of plaintiffs in each trial. The order does not detail how
this shall be accomplished, but it undoubtedly will be in
keeping with the practice of the District Court.
Rule 42, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing
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or trial 'Of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims,
counterclaims,
third-party
claims, or issues."
Under subdivision (a) the court may order a joint
hearing or trial of any issue. -cnder Subdivision (b) the
court may order a separate trial of .any separate issue.
The order as made by the trial court comes within the
provisions of this rule. In order to prevail upon their
contenti'On that the order made is unconstitutional, defendants must establish that this Court promulgated an
unconstitutional rule.
Smith v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., ~03 X.Y. 499, 96
N.E. 1106, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 137, Ann. Cas. 1913 B ~Gi,
supports the proposition that the rule and order are not
unconstitutional. Defendant there had raised the defense
of the statute of limitations. The trial court ordered that
the issue on the statute of limitations should be first tried
and the balance of the issues should thereafter be tried.
This order of the trial court was upheld on appeal. The
statute under which the order was 1nade provided:
"The court in its discretion 1nay 'Order one
or 1nore issues to be separately tried ·prior to anY
trial of the other issues in the case."
·
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5
The constitutional provision which defendant claimed
was violated provided as follows:
"The trial by jury in all cases in which it has
been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever."
In holding that this rule was not in violation of the
constitution the court stated:
"It is well settled that the object of such a
provision is to preserve the substance of the right
of trial by jury, rather than to prescribe the details of the methods by which it shall be exercised
and enjoyed ***.
"Even if we assume .as I think we should,
that this section of the Code permits separate
trials of separate issues at different times, before
different juries, it seems very clear that it does
not destroy or impair the substantial right of a
litigant to have his case tried before a proper jury,
but only prescribes the method in which this may
be done. Every issue is submitted to the verdict
of a jury. This is the substance of the right. As a
matter of convenience, the court may order some
issues to be tried before others are taken up. This,
is a matter of procedure and detail. The constitution does not provide and there should not be
interpolated into it a provision, that all of the
issues, even though completely separate and distinct, must be tried at one and the same time. No
amount of analysis will disclose any such protection or benefit to a litigant in having all of the
issues submitted to a single jury as will render
such a right one of the essential one.s secured by
the constitution. On the contrary, it is at once
apparent that the convenience of litigants may be
much promoted by a prior trial of v.arious jurisdictional and preliminary issues, and it is to be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l,

6

presumed that courts will so administer the provision in question as to make it remedial and beneficial rather than burdensome.
"There are many decisions which, in my opinion, sustain the view that the legislature had
power to enact the section as a regulation of mere
procedure, and without impairing any constitutional rights, and reference will be made to some
of them."
In Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P. 2d 589, a somewhat similar situation was presented. The case involved
an action to establish the amount due on a note and to
have it declared a lien and the lien foreclosed. On a previous appeal the Supreme Court had held the basis of
the action was to detennine the amount due on the obligation and was hence an action at law .and a jury finding
was binding upon the court. Before the case was tried
a second time the legislature amended the statutes by
providing that suits to foreclose mortgages and other
liens were equitable and the verdict of .a jury advisory.
Contention was made that the amendment was unconstitutional because it interfered with a right of trial by jury.
In overruling this contention the court stated:
''The 1945 amend1nent does not deal with the
substantive right of the parties on which they relied in their dealings with one .another out of
which this action arose, but only deals with the
method, or machinery of determining what the
facts are. It provides that in cases of this kind the
jury's decision is only advisory to the trial court
and such cases are cases in equity and therefore
under the Constitution the facts n1ust be reviewed
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by this court on appeal. That is by nature a procedural rather than a substantive right."

* * *
"Substantive law is defined as the positive
law which creates, defines and regulates the rights
and duties of the parties and which may give rise
to a cause for action, as distinguished from adjective law which pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which
the substantive law is determined or made effective."

* * *
"This statute does not contravene any constitutional provision and it certainly does not deprive any one of due process of law."
In Walker v. N e~c Mexico & S. P. R. Co., 165 U.S.
593, 17 Sup. Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 831, a New Mexico territorial statute provided for special findings of fact and
authorized the trial court to submit a case to the jury
on special findings and a general verdict. The statute
further provided that in the event there was a conflict
between the two, the special findings should prevail over
the general verdict. A judgment was entered on the special findings contrary to the general verdict. The court
held this statute did not impair the right of trial by jury
and the court stated :
"The question is whether this act of the territorial legislature in substance impairs the right of
trial by jury. The seventh amendment, indeed,
does not attempt to regulate matters of ple.ading
or practice, or to determine in what way issues
shall be framed by which questions of fact are to
be submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve
mere matters of form and procedure, but sub-
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stance of right. This requires that que;;tions of
faet in common-law actions shall be settled by a
jury, and that the court shall not assume, di~ectly
or indirectly, to take from the jury or to Itself
such prerogative. So long as this substance of
right is preserved, the procedure by which this
result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature, and the courts may not
set aside any legislative provision in this respect
because the form of action-the mere manner in
which questions are submitted-is different from
that which obtained at the common law."
See also Gasoline Products Co.

t·.

Chamberlain Rfg.

Co., 283 U.S. 494, 51 S. Ct. 513, 75 L. Ed. 1188; JJ ay Department Stores Co., v. Bell, 61 F. 2d 830.
There is nothing in either sections 7 or 10 of Article
1 of the Utah Constitution which in any way prohibits the
type of order made in this case or the promulgation of
such a rule as Rule -±:2, r tah Rules of CiYil Procedure.
Section 7 is merely the general provision prohibiting
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Section 10, so far as civil rases are concerned, sets forth the number of jurors which shall make
up the jury and the number of jurors necessary to return
a verdict. The order and rule in the rase at bar n1erely
establishes a method of detennining facts by a jury or
juries. They do not affect the snbstantiYe right of trial
by jury which is .all the constitution protects.
We submit that there is nothing here which would in
any way give any credence or 1nerit to defendants' contentions.
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The authorities all uphold the exercise by the trial
court of its discretion in ordering a trial of liability
separate and apart from that of damages.
In 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Page 657, Section 941, states as follows:
"Where several actions are ordered to be
tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge
the suits into a single action, or cause the parties
to one action to be parties to another. In this type
of situation the court may not only order that all
.actions be tried together but may also order that
any issue common to them be so tried. Rule 42 (a)
expressly provides that the court may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions. For example if several persons are suing the same defendant for injuries
sustained in the same accident, the court may
order a joint trial of the issue of defendant's liability, leaving the issue of damages to be determined in each case if the issue of liability is determined against the defendant. It is interesting
to note that much the same procedure would have
resulted under Rule 42 (b) in a case in which all
the plaintiffs had joined in the same action and
the court ordered a separate trial of the issue of
liability."
And again .at Page 663, Section 942, it is stated:
"As pointed out in Section 941, a number of
actions in tort arising out of the same occurrence
may be consolidated for the trial of the issue of
negligence. If the plaintiffs prevail on this issue,
separate trials may be subsequently had in each
case as to the remaining issues."
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5 Moore's Federal Practice 1217, Section 42.03, .states
the rule as follows :
"Separate trial may properly be ordered on
the issue of the defendant's lia;bility to respond in
damages, particularly where plaintiff's proof of
damages would involve the testimony of a large
number of person.s. This procedure has been
privately recommended by a number of members
of the judiciary as a means of expediting trials
and of saving time and expense. We have found
no reason why this procedure, which is authorized
by Rule 42 (b) should not be more extensively
employed. A separate trial may be granted on a
particular issue after appeal and remand for further proceedings.''

InN ettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 234 F. 2d 243, the court ordered three actions
arising out of the same automobile collision to be consolidated for trial on the question of liability only. This
ruling was upheld by the circuit court and it was stated
in the opinion :
"Appellants' objection to the trial court's
having consolidated the three civil actions with the
interpleader action is also without merit. Consolidation of the several cases involving common
questions of law .and fact for trial under Rule -!:2,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was in all respects proper."

In /(lager v. Inland Power & Lipllf Company, 1
F.R.D. 114 and Rickenbacker Transportation, Inc. r.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 3 F.R.D. 202, the question of liability in tort actions was ordered to be tried separately
from the question of damages.
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It has been held proper for the trial court to order
a separate trial of the issue as to the validity of a release
relied upon by defendant in a personal injury case. Bowie
v. Sorrell, 209 F. 2d 49; Kilospki v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
103 F. Supp. 390; Larson v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322.
In Carr v. Beverly Hills Corporation, 237 F. 2d 323,
the trial court tried a jurisdictional issue separately.
In approving, the court stated:
"By another rule, the court is empowered to
isolate and try any issue in the case. Rule 42 (b)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.
Since jurisdiction depends upon the facts and not,
in the final analysis, upon the pleading, we hold
it was proper for the court to try the facts at the
basis of this question before going further. This
is e_specially to be commended because, as noted
above, the question must be tried, is decisive and
cannot be waived. There is nothing inconsistent
in this determination with the cases tried or disposed of before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. All these are to be distinguished."
Defendants quote Sections 78-21-1 and 2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and as.sert that because the definite
article "the" is used before the word jury it means that
all issues of fact in a given case must be submitted to one
jury. The legislature did not in any way seek to reach
this subject. It merely affirmed the right of a person to a
jury trial. An examination of said Section 1 disclose.s that
"in actions for the recovery *** for injuries, an issue of
fact may be tried by a jury ***." This would indicate a
specific issue of fact may be tried by a jury and then upon
determination of that issue another issue of fact may be
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tried by another jury. In any event, Rule 42 authorizes
the procedure which was ordered in the case at bar. The
statutes relate to the substantive right of jury trial and
the rule relates to a procedural matter defining the
methods by which facts may be determined by a jury.
Defendants are not deprived of a jury trial. All of the
issues in this case will eventually be submitted to a jury.
Defendants have cited .a number of authorities in
their brief, but we submit they are not in point here and
have the further disability that they are of ancient vintage. We are concerned here with a rule which became
effective in 1950. This rule in turn was patterned after
the ]"~ederal rule on the same subject and those rules
were promulgated in 1937 and amended in 1946. The
cases cited range from 1869 to 1918.
In Donnatin v. [~nion Hardware & JI etal Co., 38 Cal.
App. 8, 175 P. 26, 177 P. 8-±5 (1918), plaintiff sought to
recover for personal injuries. The jury returned a verdict in his favor of $1.00. He 1noved for a new trial on the
question of damages only. The court's denial of this motion was .affirmed. The court rightly ruled that this was
obviously a compromise verdict and that the mnount was
so grossly absurb that it furnished convincing proof that
in order to reach an agreen1ent the verdict was the result of unwarranted concessions of convictions made
by each of two opposing factions of the jury. Here there
had been no proper detern1ination of the issue of liability
and the trial court's order was affinned. The order "~as
within the discretion of the trial court.
:Motion was Inade to permit a transfer of the ease
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to the Supreme Court of California and in 177 P. 845, the
Supreme Court recognized the right of a court to order
a new trial on limited issues and the court stated:
"The power of the court to order a new trial
on limited issues is well settled. It has discretion
to order a new trial generally or only in part. Its
discretion is this regard is properly invoked by a
motion for a new trial of the entire case, and it
may well be doubted whether this discretion can
be circumscribed by me.ans of a motion for a new
trial of one issue alone. A determination of this
question is, however, not essential to the decision
of the present case, and we do not here determine
it. In any view, the trial court may properly deny
a limited new trial where it is of opinion, on the
whole record before it, that substantial justice requires that a new trial, if granted .at all, should
cover all the issues."
A~ a matter of fact separate trials of the issue of
liability and of the issue of damages are not new in cases
where new trials have been ordered. 39 Am. Jur. 44, New
Trial, section 21; Annotations at 98 A.L.R. 941, 29 A.L.R.
2d 1199. In this latter annotation the rule is stated as
follows (1203):
"With the few exceptions noted under the
heading 'Contrary view,' infra, it is universally
recognized and held either with or without a pertinent statute or rule of court, that a new trial
gr.anted on the ground of the inadequacy of the
damages awarded may in a proper case be limited
to the issue of damages only."
Where code provisions or rules are applicable, the
rule is stated as follows (1205):
"In many jurisdictions code provision or rules
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of court providing for the granting of a new trial
to all or .any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues have been construed or recognized as authorizing the granting of a new trial on the issue
of damages alone in a proper case where the verdict originally rendered is found to be inadequate.''
In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Company,
228 U.S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. Ed. 879 (1912), a
general verdict for plaintiff was rendered by the jury.
Defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and this latter motion was denied. The Circuit
court reversed and ordered that judgment be entered for
defendant. The Supreme Court held the authority of a
Federal appellate court was limited to ordering a new
trial and that such court had no power to direct the
entry of judgment.
The other authorities cited under this point of defendants' brief are ones which were cited and quoted
in the Slocum case. They are even less in point than the
Slocum case. In Petty v. Schmeider, 9 ""Tall. 2-!S, 19 L.
Ed. 648 (1869), testimony taken in another case was introduced in evidence but not read to the jury. The trial
court told the jury in his instruction what this evidence
established. In such a case the cmnplaining party against
whom the evidence was introduced was deprived of a
jury trial because the evidence was not even sub1nitted
to the jury. In Hodges v. Easton~ 106lT.S. -!OS, 1 Sup. Ct.
307, 27 L. Ed. 169 (1882). the plaintiff urged that the
court in its order of reversal direct the trial court to restrict the next trial to such issues as were not subn1itted
to the jury. The court express}~~ refused to 1nake a deter-
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mination of its power to make such an order inasmuch
as the issues decided by the jury were not submitted to
it in the method required by law. The court reversed
and ordered a whole new trial. Neither of these cases has
anything to do with the problem before the court in the
case at bar.
Defendants, throughout the first point, make general
allegations that the trial of liability only and damages
later would result in great inconvenience to all concerned
and that such order and trial would greatly prejudice the
parties. The defendants do not state specifically of what
this prejudice or inconvenience consists. Implicit, however, in their .argument is the contention that a jury
considering both questions of liability and damage may
compromise or cut down damages because it might think
the proof of liability to be weak. A jury could not properly arrive at a verdict in this manner. The proper procedure would be for the jury to first make a determination of the question of liability and if it determined there
w.as no liability that would end the case. If it found that
there was liability then the next consideration should be
that of damage. We do not believe that any defendants
have a right to a compromise verdict and such verdict
is not part and parcel of the right of trial by jury.
The trial court believed that it would be in furtherance of convenience and in avoidance of prejudice to
order a separate trial on the question of liability. It
would bring about a determination of one phase of the
case and if favorable to defendants it would end the matter. If favorable to plaintiffs then the only proof in the
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next group of cases would relate to damages. In the
interests of time, economy, and the fair and just disposition of the litigation, the court properly ordered a
separation of trials. This will not multiply the number
of trials but will cut them down considerably and eliminate the need for the continual presentation in each case
of evidence on the question of liability. It would be a
physical and mental impossibility for one jury to retain
in mind the names and damages of each of 19 plaintiffs
who are involved in the 11 cases now before the court.
One of the questions on the issue of liability is
whether or not Suhrmann was acting as agent for Valley
Sausage or Jordan Meat in smoking the mettwurst. Under the trial court's order this will only have to be tried
once. Would it not be in the interest of time and economy
not to have Mr. Suhrmann, ~Irs. Suhrmann, :\Irs. Young,
Alfred Hoffman, Albert N oorda, Karl Klindt and :\Ir.
Goeller testify concerning this issue eleven different
times~ This alone justifies the order. There are other
factual matters which go to the issue of liability only and
one trial likewise will cause a saYing in tilne and expense
in these matters.
These are the considerations which ilnpelled the trial
court to enter the order fr01n which appeal is here taken.
We submit that the order was neither in violation of
the constitution, contrary to law. or erroneous.
POINT II.
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY
IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS, AND
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WOULD NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE
DEFENDANTS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING SAID ORDER.

Under this point in their brief defendants contend
that the order is prejudicial to them and would result in
manifest injustice to them.
The courts uniformly hold under Rule 42 the consolidation of cases, or the separation of the trial of issues,
is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court and its order with respect thereto will not be
reversed unless the appellate court finds there has been
an abuse of discretion. Chicago R. I. & P .R. Co.
v. Williams, 245 F. 2d 397; Davis v. Yellow Cab Company,
220 F. 2d 790; 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.) 1204,
section 42.02.
Under the authorities heretofore cited and the argument heretofore made, the making of this order was not
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and
hence the order should be affirmed. Two cases are cited
under Point II of the Brief of Appellants. It should be
observed that both of these cases are from federal district courts and do not involve an appellate review of an
order made under Rule 42. It may well be that under
either of these cases the trial court could have either
granted or denied the motion and the ruling would not
have been an abuse of discretion. The.se cases are only
helpful in disclosing the manner in which the trial courts
exercised their discretion.
In United States v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 9
F.R.D. 179, the action sounded in fraud, which has
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nothing to do with the situation presented in the case at
bar.
In Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 20
F.R.D. 204, the plaintiff brought action to recover damages resulting from an explosion in his grain elevator.
The action was brought against insurance companies and
against the contractor who had constructed the elevator.
Another party intervened who apparently claimed to
own some of the property destroyed in the elevator. The
insurance companies sought a separate trial on the issues
between plaintiff and the insurance companies. This was
denied and the court concluded that one trial would be
adequate, more economical and would bring about a just
determination of the litigation. There onl:~ one suit was
involved and the defendant insurance companies were
seeking to make out of it more than one trial.
In the cases at bar there are 11 separate suits involving 19 plaintiffs. The order cutting down the trial of
liability to one case and then a determination of damages
will eliminate the necessity for a trial of liability in 11
distinct cases and will eliminate calling witnesses on liability time and time again. \Vith the question of liability
determined, the courts and juries may then make a determination of damage if the liability problem has been determined in the favor of the various plaintiffs. \Ve submit there was no prejudice to defendants and no manifest injustice to them.
CO~CLlTSION

We submit that under the situation existing in the
cases at bar the trial court was well advised to attempt
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to cut down the numbe,r of trials and the necessity of
continually recalling witnesses on liability. The trial of
the question of liability will eliminate once and for all
that problem. It may end the case at that point. If it
does not, then the trial of damages may be held in the
future in various groups of these cases .and plaintiffs.
The order does not eliminate the right of defendants
to have each and every issue tried by a jury of their peers.
It may be that more than one jury will decide the issues,
but there is nothing in the constitution, statutes, or authorities which would militate again.st the authority of
the court to order separate trials before separate juries.
Under Rule 42 that procedure is contemplated. To hold
otherwise would eliminate Rule -12 and hold that it meant
nothing insofar as it authorized consolidation of issues
or separation of issues.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGs, WALLACE, RoBERTS
CANNON

&

BLACK

& DuFFIN

Counsel for Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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